

Message Text

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E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OAS

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS
AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES - OASGA-25

FOR AMBASSADORS IN ACTION CAPITALS FROM CRIMMINS

1. SUMMARY: OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSED, AFTER LENGTHY
NEGOTIATIONS, QUITE ACCEPTABLE CONSENSUS DECLARATION ON
QUOTE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG THE AMERICAN
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STATES UNQUOTE WHICH REAFFIRMED (BECAUSE OF INCORPORATION
OF LANGUAGE PUSHED BY U. S. AND BRAZIL), AUTHORITY OF RIO

TREATY AND DECISIONS TAKEN UNDER IT WHILE AT SAME TIME, UNDER RUBRIC OF QUOTE PLURALITY OF IDEOLOGIES UNQUOTE IT RECOGNIZED REALITY OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY IN HEMISPHERE. RESOLUTION'S OUTCOME AVOIDED POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE CONFRONTATION (WHICH CHILE HAD SOUGHT) OVER CUBAN ISSUE AND QUITE POSSIBLE DEFEAT FOR U. S. AND ITS ALLIES ON THIS QUESTION. END SUMMARY.

2. ORIGINAL RESOLUTION, SPONSORED BY COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR AND URUGUAY, WAS RELATIVELY ANODYNE EFFORT (LARGELY THE MAKING OF COLOMBIAN FONMIN VASQUEZ) TO FIND CONSENSUS IN HEMISPHERE ON RECOGNIZING DIVERSITY OF REGIMES IN HEMISPHERE WHILE AT SAME TIME AFFIRMING PRINCIPLE OF NON- INTERVENTION. IT WAS IN EFFECT QUOTE MOTHERHOOD UNQUOTE RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO TIDE OVER CUBA PROBLEM AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY. U. S., BRAZIL, AND LIKE MINDED LATINS AT ASSEMBLY SAW OPPORTUNITY TO BEEF UP RESOLUTION SOMEWHAT MORE ON SIDE OF NON- INTERVENTION (READ HERE SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA) AND RELATED MATTERS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OASGA SUPPORT FOR JURIDICAL INTEGRITY OF SANCTIONS AND AVOID BLOW- UP ON CUBAN ISSUE AND POTENTIAL PROPAGANDA VICTORY FOR CASTRO.

3. CHILE, OBVIOUSLY HOPING TO ISOLATE THE U. S. AND BRAZIL FROM THE MAJORITY WHO SEEMED READY TO VOTE FOR ALMOST ANY KIND OF QUOTE MOTHERHOOD UNQUOTE RESOLUTION, DIRECTLY INTRODUCED CUBAN ISSUE (WHICH HAD BEEN LARGELY LEFT UNSPOKEN) BY PRESENTING UNHELPFUL(BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US) AMENDMENT AND ABOVE ALL, BY MAKING DIRECT ISSUE OF CUBA IN HIS EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT. BRAZIL PERHAPS OVER- REACTED IN ITS RESPONSE, DIRECTLY RAISING QUESTION OF ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND ISSUE WAS JOINED IN FASHION WHICH CHILE EXPLOITED BY CALLING DIFFERENCES IRRECONCILABLE AND DEMANDING IMMEDIATE VOTE AS BETWEEN FOUR- POWER (PLUS CHILE) RESOLUTION AND VERY STRONG BRAZILIAN COUNTER- AMENDMENT. WE AND SEVERAL LATIN SUPPORTERS OF SANCTIONS HAD CHOSEN TO MAKE LOW KEY EXPLANATIONS OF OUR VIEWS ON CUBA ISSUE COUPLED WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF TEXT IN EXPECTATION THAT WORKING GROUP WOULD EVENTUALLY RESOLVE MATTERS TO OUR SATISFACTION.

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4. IN SOMEWHAT CONFUSED ATMOSPHERE WE BEGAN WORKING WITH LIKE MINDED DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND URUGUAY (THE LATTER, ALTHOUGH CO- SPONSOR OF ORIGINAL RESOLUTION HAD BEEN DISMAYED BY TURN OF EVENTS SINCE, AS FONMIN BLANCO EMPHASIZED TO US, ORIGINAL RESOLUTION WAS AS FAR AS HE WOULD GO ON CUBA QUESTION) TO TRY TO GET HELPFUL AMENDMENTS FORMULATED FOR WORKING GROUP WHICH URUGUAY PROPOSED. BLANCO DID SO WITHOUT CONSULTING COLOMBIA AND VASQUEZ BECAME RATHER UPSET FOR

A TIME, ALTHOUGH HE LATER HELPED GREATLY IN REACHING FINAL, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COSTA RICA PROPOSED SHUTTING OFF DEBATE (HER CHIEF DELEGATE, VICE- MINISTER SALAZAR WAS UNHELPFUL ON THIS ISSUE AS ON SEVERAL OTHERS) THIS PROPOSAL FORTUNATELY FAILED. OTHERWISE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VERY UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OF PROBABLY BEING IN DISTINCT MINORITY IN FAVOR OF HARD BRAZILIAN AMENDMENT AND LATER IN OPPOSITION TO FOUR- COUNTRY RESOLUTION IN MOVE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS DEFEAT FOR U. S. AND VICTORY FOR SOFT- LINERS. URUGUAY' S MOTION FOR WORKING GROUP THEN PASSED BY ONLY ONE VOTE.

6. CALVANI NAMED COLOMBIA, URUGUAY, CHILE AND BRAZIL TO WORKING GROUP. U. S. AND MEXICO JOINED WORKING GROUP AND IN LENGTHY EARLY A. M. NEGOTIATIONS WORE DOWN CHILEAN, AS SPIRIT OF CONSENSUS SEEMED TO MOTIVATE OTHER LATINS. TERM QUOTE IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM UNQUOTE, WHICH GAVE BRAZIL MAJOR PROBLEM AND WORRIED OTHER ANTI- CUBAN DELEGATIONS BECAUSE OF PURPORTED POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS (APPARENTLY MOSTLY DOMESTIC) AS LEFTIST SLOGAN, WAS FINALLY NEGOTIATED INTO QUOTE PLURALITY OF IDEOLOGIES UNQUOTE, ACCEPTED AS BEING REFLECTION OF STATE OF WORLD. MORE IMPORTANTLY, LANGUAGE WAS ADDED TO EFFECT THAT DECLARATION WAS MADE QUOTE SUBJECT TO NORMS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CHARTER AND OF SPECIAL TREATIES (MEANING RIO TREATY) MENTIONED IN IT UNQUOTE.

7. THIS LANGUAGE AND FINAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF RESOLUTION WERE MAJOR ADDITIONS ADDED AT INSISTENCE OF
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U. S., BRAZIL AND URUGUAY. LATTER PART READS QUOTE THIS DECLARATION WAS MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NORMS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION, THE SPECIAL TREATIES MENTIONED IN IT AND RESOLUTION 78 OF THE SECOND REGULAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE. (RESOLUTION 78 STRONGLY REAFFIRMED NON- INTERVENTION).

8. FOR BRASILIA: MACIEL AND ZAPPA PERFORMED VALIANTLY THROUGH TODAY' S EARLY MORNING HOURS. IT WAS DUE TO THEM AS MUCH AS TO ANYONE THAT HARD- LINERS ON CUBA WERE ABLE TO STAVE OFF A PROPAGANDA DEFEAT WITH IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR CUBAN SANCTIONS BUT FOR BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES' LONG RUN RELATIONS WITH SPANISH SPEAKING AMERICA. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS QUITE ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION WAS UNPLEASANT: A QUITE LIKELY DEFEAT ON MATTER WHICH THROUGH CHILEAN- BRAZILIAN INTERACTION CAME TO FOCUS SHARPLY ON CUBAN QUESTION . IN FACT, WE BELIEVE WE CAME OUT BETTER ON THIS ISSUE THAN WE HAD EXPECTED BEFORE OASGA,

BECAUSE OF VERY EXPLICIT REAFFIRMATIONS OF QUOTE SPECIAL TREATIES UNQUOTE AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHARTER AND ALL THAT IMPLIES. THIS DECLARATION RECOGNIZES POLITICAL REALITY OF CONTINENT WHILE PRESERVING THE MECHANICS OF HEMISPHERIC SECURITY. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, RESOLUTION REFLECTS VERY WELL STANDARD USG POSITION THAT WE DO NOT CONCERN OURSELVES WITH INTERNAL SYSTEMS, ACCEPTING THEIR DIVERSITY, AND THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES DEPEND ON THEIR ACTIONS TOWARD OUR INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INTER- AMERICAN SYSTEM. PLEASE CONVEY THIS TO FOREIGN MINISTER GIBSON PROMPTLY. FYI MACIEL AND ZAPPA WERE OBVIOUSLY UNEASY ABOUT POSSIBLE REACTIONS IN BRASILIA TO THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF CONSENSUS.

THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WERE APPARENTLY LESS FLEXIBLE THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN, GIVEN FLUID SITUATION, AND WHILE THEY KNOW THEY HAVE GOTTEN MORE THAN BRAZIL EXPECTED, THEY ARE CONCERNED LEST BRASILIA NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT ALTER-NATIVES WERE. THEY WOULD BE RELIEVED IF WE WOULD EXPLAIN BACKGROUND TO GIBSON. END FYI.

9. FOR ASUNCION AND LA PAZ: BOTH AMBASSADORS WERE SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLE. PLEASE ASSURE ASAP FONMIN OR PRESIDENT THAT WE WERE IN TOUCH EVERY STEP OF THE WAY AND
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THAT BY NOT OPPOSING CONSENSUS (WHICH WAS NECESSARY OR WHOLE EFFORT WOULD HAVE FALLEN APART), THEY HELPED FORESTALL PROBABLE SOFT- LINE WIN ON CUBA, AND, MOREOVER, THAT CHANGES IN WORDING SHOULD RELIEVE ANY CONCERN THAT RESOLUTION HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL POLICIES.

10. AT LEAST FOR NOW, REPORTERS ATTENDING OASGA ARE INTERPRETING CONSENSUS AS BACK- DOWN BY SOFT- LINERS (WHICH TO A DEGREE IT WAS). BRAZILIAN DELEGATION PLEASED BY THIS REACTION, WHICH SHOULD HAVE GOOD EFFECT IN BRAZIL. SAME, WE ASSUME, WILL BE TRUE IN LA PAZ AND ASUNCION. ROGERS

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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